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1. Introduction
The greatest challenge for the education sector this Parliament is to raise school pupils’ 
achievement at a lower cost to the taxpayer. This will benefit all public service users by 
maximising the impact of school education and freeing up funds for other sectors, such 
as college and further education. Yet it will not be easy for schools. The Government’s 
commitment to protect cash spending per pupil implies a significant real terms squeeze, 
and pay rises and changes to employers’ contributions are expected to push school 
costs up. Unless the Government enables the school system to provide better value for 
money, the performance of English pupils will continue to dwindle in international 
comparisons – and every child will be worse off because of it. 
The Coalition Government sought to raise achievement by extending autonomy to more 
schools. Its predecessor attempted it through large increases in public investment. 
Neither policy has improved value for money. Previous research by Reform found no 
simple link between schools’ spending and their pupils’ results, indicating that schools 
could, in theory, improve results without receiving more money.1 This chapter finds that 
education productivity has almost certainly been over-estimated due to grade inflation. 
While it is not known how much annual grade rises represent real or inflated 
improvements in pupils’ education, even a modest estimation finds that education 
productivity has fallen rather than risen in recent years. In other words, the amount of time 
and effort exerted on education is not being translated into better teaching.
A new approach is needed that maximises the value created by every teacher and school, 
thereby improving wellbeing. As the Director for Education and Skills at the OECD, 
Andreas Schleicher, has said, “[t]he wellbeing of individuals and nations depend on 
nothing more than on what people know and what they can do with what they know.”2 
Acquiring knowledge, skills and competencies lifts earnings, improves trust between 
people and facilitates the development of shared cultural norms. Higher levels of 
education improve physical health and increase personal fulfilment. Together and 
separately, these effects – higher earnings, better health and greater fulfilment – generate 
higher levels of individual wellbeing.
Improving wellbeing in the English education system requires a focus on autonomy, 
accountability and funding. Both the World Bank and OECD consider autonomy and 
accountability to be important factors in improving pupils’ outcomes, although the impact 
they report is contingent on the level and type of autonomy and accountability.3,4 To 
maximise wellbeing from these policy levers, the Government should aim to ensure:
 > More autonomy: by encouraging schools to use their autonomy to innovate, the 
future challenges facing the school system will be addressed more effectively and at 
a lower cost.
 > Better accountability: by improving school accountability, schools will focus on 
raising achievement for all, but particularly for the least advantaged. 
 > Fairer funding: a consistent and fair funding formula would reallocate resource to the 
most disadvantaged pupils and allow a better comparison of schools’ relative value 
for money.
The Coalition Government made some progress on school accountability and autonomy, 
but more is possible. While it championed school and professional autonomy, it did not 
create the right environment for schools and teachers to use their autonomy to innovate. 
And while it reformed the school accountability system to focus schools’ resources on all 
1  Lauren Thorpe, Kimberley Trewhitt and James Zuccollo, Must Do Better: Spending on Schools, Reform, May 2013.
2  Andreas Schleicher, “Don’t Give Up on Education for All,” The Huffington Post, 2 April 2014.
3  Gustavo Arcia, Kevin Macdonald, Harry Anthony Patrinos and Emilio Porta, “School Autonomy and Accountability,” 
System Assessment for Benchmarking Education for Results, Regulatory and Institutional Framework, World Bank, 
Human Development Network, Washington, DC, 2011.
4  OECD, School Autonomy and Accountability: Are They Related to Student Performance?, 2011.
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pupils, rather than just some, it did not reform school funding to ensure a consistent 
distribution of resources to pupils in different parts of the country. Moreover, by 
maintaining the ringfence on the schools budget, the Coalition prevented an honest 
discussion about how best to maximise wellbeing from this budget and across other 
areas of education spending. 
2. The case for reform
The education system in England has a productivity problem. Productivity in education 
refers to the amount of activity needed within the sector to deliver the same standard of 
education to the same number of people. On a crude interpretation, this productivity 
problem has been created by coincident spending rises and falls in pupil numbers. Figure 
1 shows that total spending on education rose year on year between 1997 and its height 
in 2010, both in real terms and as a percentage of GDP. The gradients show that 
education spending grew fastest between 2006 and 2010, during which period pupil 
numbers fell. Between 1997 and 2013, spending rose by 166 per cent whereas pupil 
numbers fell by 1 per cent. 5
Figure 1: Trends in education spending and pupil numbers5
Sources: HM Treasury (2014), Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses; 
Department for Education (2014), National Pupil Projections; Reform calculations.
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Since 2010, pupil numbers have been rising steadily, and are due to rise by 8 per cent over 
the next Parliament (see Figure 1). This will place significant pressure on existing and 
planned resource and capital budgets for schools. While the Government has committed to 
protecting cash spending per pupil, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) has estimated that 
this will result in a 7 per cent real terms cut per pupil.6 Accounting for increases in National 
Insurance, pension contributions and public sector earnings growth, the real terms cut is 
estimated to be between 9 and 12 per cent per pupil.7 As more children reach school age 
and costs rise, the schools sector must become more productive to maintain current levels 
of education. It will need to educate more people for a lower per pupil cost. 
5  Underlying spending data in 2013-14 prices using ONS GDP deflator. Spending data for 1997-98 is on an accruals basis, 
whereas data for 1998-99 to 2013-14 is on a cash basis.
6  Luke Sibieta, “Schools Spending,” Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2015.
7  Ibid. 
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Official productivity estimates (see Figure 2) show that productivity was in decline between 
2000 and 2008 (with very small gains in 2003 and 2004), but is now steadily improving.8 
The period of decline coincides with the time when education spending was rising fastest, 
during the last two Labour Governments. The growth rates show the year-on-year change 
in productivity; that is, how much activity is needed to convert inputs into outputs, where 
inputs refer to the amount of labour, capital and goods and services, and outputs refer to 
the number of students and quality of education. 9
Figure 2: UK education productivity growth rates9
Source: Office for National Statistics (2014), Public Service Productivity Estimates: 
Education, 2012 
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The Office for National Statistics (ONS) estimates education output by calculating the 
quantity of people receiving education in each sector (primary, secondary and further 
education) adjusted for the quality of education received. For all sectors, the output 
quality is calculated using Key Stage 4 (KS4) performance at a national level.10 An 
uncapped Average Point Score (APS) is calculated by multiplying the number of GCSE 
and GCSE-equivalent subjects each student takes by the difficulty level (higher grades 
score higher points).11 
While APS at GCSE may well be the most suitable measure of education quality at a 
national level, it is contentious for two reasons. Firstly, it does not measure quality at either 
primary school or in further education. Secondly, it does not provide a full picture of 
children’s outcomes at school. Children may be able to complete exams and coursework 
well, but might nevertheless lack the knowledge and skills in that subject area. Wider 
aspects of a school, such as the provision of extra curricula activities, add greatly to 
pupils’ engagement and enjoyment in school, but will not necessarily be reflected in exam 
results. In addition, there is concern of a growing disconnect between traditional 
academic qualifications and ‘non-cognitive’ skills, such as the ability to learn 
independently, or cope in difficult situations. Nevertheless, alternative measures of 
8  Office for National Statistics, Public Service Productivity Estimates: Education, 2012, September 2014. 
9  Output includes early years, primary, secondary and further education. Input includes capital services, goods and 
services and labour.
10  Office for National Statistics, Public Service Productivity Estimates: Education, 2012.
11  This contrasts the new capped APS measure, which similarly scores pupils’ performance, but only across their best 
eight subjects.
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education outcomes are in their infancy, and not developed enough to use here.12
The return to productivity growth illustrated in Figure 2 is, on the face of it, counterintuitive. 
Pupil numbers have been falling since 2003 and only started to rise again in 2011 (see 
Figure 1).13 Taking this fact in isolation would suggest a decrease, rather than increase, in 
productivity, as the quantity of pupils taking exams would be lower. There is also a 
substantive body of evidence to suggest that GCSE headline results have been subject to 
grade inflation.14 This would imply that some of the rise in GCSE results have not been 
due to real improvements in education. If true, the official estimates of productivity growth 
are overstated. 
To determine how much quality adjustment affects their output estimate, the ONS 
measures the contribution of quality adjustment on output over time. Figure 3 shows that 
quality adjustments have a much greater impact on education output than quantity. This is 
important because it means that declining pupil numbers would have a much lesser 
impact on overall productivity than improvement in pupils’ results.
Figure 3: Impact of quality adjustment on education output, 1996-2012
Source: Office for National Statistics (2014), Public Service Productivity Estimates: 
Education, 2012
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One alternative measure for the quality of education in the UK can be found through 
international comparisons. The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is 
a triennial exercise organised by the OECD and run across 65 countries.15 It compares the 
performance of 15 year olds in tests that measure key competencies in reading, maths 
and science. Given that the ONS measures UK education productivity, mean scores for 
the UK are used rather than scores for England. The UK sample size was too small in the 
first two years that PISA was conducted (2000 and 2003), so these have been omitted 
(see Appendix A for the methodology).
Trends in International Mathematics and Science (TIMSS) is a quadrennial international 
assessment run across 52 countries at both age 10 (Year 5) and age 14 (Year 9). The tests 
measure key competencies in maths and science across these age groups and have been 
12  See for example the Association of School and College Leaders’ alternative league tables and Cambridge Assessment’s 
work with Open Public Services.
13  Department for Education, “Schools, Pupils and Their Characteristics: January 2014,” 12 June 2014. 
14  See for instance Robert Coe, Changes in Standards at GCSE and A-Level: Evidence from ALIS and YELLIS, April 2007; 
Robert Coe, Improving Education: A Triumph of Hope over Experience, June 2013.
15  The number of countries included in PISA has grown each year since the first assessment in 2000.
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running since 1999. Results are published for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland separately; this analysis uses data from England only. This is likely to produce an 
optimistic measure of performance for the UK as a whole, as Wales performed significantly 
lower than England in PISA 2012 across reading, maths and science. England, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland performed similarly well across all three subjects.16
In contrast to rises in national KS4 figures, the UK’s performance in PISA and England’s 
performance in TIMSS has remained relatively stable. Appendix A shows the effect of 
using these different measures to quality adjust education output. While the change in 
scores between years is not always statistically significant, the appendix provides 
confidence intervals for PISA scores at 10th and 90th percentile. These show that it is 
extremely unlikely that the PISA scores could be as high as KS4 scores. While PISA and 
TIMSS do not measure the same competencies as KS4 performance, they nevertheless 
measure important aspects of education outcomes.
Figure 4 shows the impact of using different quality adjustments on education 
productivity. Using PISA or TIMSS in place of the ONS’s APS measure has a considerable 
impact on education productivity. Rather than returning to growth, as the ONS suggests, 
these new estimates show that productivity has declined. 
Figure 4: Effect of different quality adjustments on productivity
Sources: OECD (2006, 2009, 2012), Programme for International Student 
Assessment: What Students Know and Can Do; National Foundation for 
Educational Research (2011), TIMSS 2011: mathematics and science achievement 
in England; Office for National Statistics (2014), Public Service Productivity 
Estimates: Education, 2012; Reform calculations. 
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The difference between these two quality measures and the ONS measure is stark. 
PISA-adjusted productivity shows a reduction of three index points between 2006 and 
16  Rebecca Wheater, Juliet Sizmur, Bethan Burge, Robert Ager, OECD programme for international student assessment 
and National Foundation for Educational Research, Achievement of 15-Year-Olds in Wales: PISA 2012 National Report. 
OECD Programme for International Student Assessment: Report, April 2014.
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2012, rather than a rise of 15 index points. TIMSS-adjusted productivity shows a 
reduction of 30 index points between 1999 and 2011, rather than a rise of three index 
points. These results paint a broader picture of UK education productivity and thus should 
be used in conjunction with the ONS estimates, rather than as an alternative to them.
While not a definitive calculation of UK education productivity, this alternative assessment 
suggests the schools sector is providing worse value for money than it did ten years ago. 
Even if real productivity sits somewhere between the Reform and ONS estimation, 
improving value for money requires urgent attention. Cost pressures are unlikely to abate; 
even so, achieving more for less will improve the wellbeing of school pupils’ and take 
pressure off other important education budgets. To drive up productivity and deliver better 
value for money the Government should focus on three areas of reform: autonomy, 
accountability and funding.
3. More autonomy
Schools that are able to use the expertise of their staff to innovate can improve pupils’ 
attainment overall and for the most disadvantaged. Teachers and school leaders work 
more closely with pupils than central government does, and are therefore best placed to 
know what works. In theory, though perhaps less in practice, these two beliefs have 
driven school reform over the last two decades, from the first City Technology Colleges in 
the late 1980s to the now much expanded academy programme.
The Coalition Government drove a large expansion in school autonomy and put a strong 
emphasis on professional autonomy. Yet schools and teachers still face barriers to 
innovation, which are preventing the system from giving the most to pupils. The 
Government should make autonomy the ‘new norm’ so that it is easier for schools to 
innovate. It must also encourage schools to build capacity so that they can harness the 
skills and expertise needed to drive innovation.
3.1 Freedom and autonomy for schools
Extending school autonomy was central to the Coalition Government’s aim to raise overall 
achievement and narrow the achievement gap. The previous Labour Government converted 
some ‘failing’17 local authority schools to new City Academies, schools independent of local 
authority control and management, with greater freedom over the curriculum, teacher terms 
and conditions, teacher pay and school and term dates. Unlike  under Labour, the Coalition 
Government brought forward new legislation to enable all schools to apply for conversion. 
The Coalition Government also diversified school choice by introducing four new forms of 
schools: free schools, university technology colleges, careers colleges and studio schools. 
While these are legally identical to academy schools, they are small in number.
Evidence suggests that the pre-2010 sponsored academies were successful in raising 
pupils’ attainment compared to local authority schools, even when controlling for pupils’ 
prior attainment.18,19 It should be noted however that previous to 2011-12, sponsored 
academies received more funding than their entitlement allowed, due to an accounting 
error in the Department for Education (DfE).20 There is mixed evidence as to whether 
sponsored academies have been successful in narrowing the attainment gap between 
pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds and everyone else. While the proportion of pupils 
on free school meals achieving 5+ A*-C GCSEs has risen faster in sponsored academies 
than in local authority schools,21 this could be explained by changes to sponsored 
17  Ofsted rates schools across four categories, ‘outstanding’, ‘good’, ‘requires improvement’ and ‘inadequate’ (‘failing’).
18  Andrew Eyles and Stephen Machin, “The Introduction of Academy Schools to England’s Education,” September 2014.
19  It should be noted that pupils attending pre-2010 sponsored academies have a higher prior attainment than those 
attending similar maintained schools. However, Eyles and Machin (2014) controlled for pupils’ prior attainment in their 
study.
20  Chris Cook, “Blunder gives academies extra cash,” Financial Times, 16 June 2011.
21  House of Commons Education Select Committee, Academies and Free Schools, Fourth Report of Session 2014-15, 
January 2015.
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academy schools’ intake.22 Other research suggests that sponsored academies have had 
no significant effect on pupils’ achievement at the bottom of the ability distribution.23 
It is too early to judge the success of the more recent converter academies, which 
converted to academy status from a position of strength. However, initial studies have 
shown there to be a limited impact of academy conversion on pupils’ attainment 
progress.24 As these converter academies were originally ‘outstanding’, the results may 
be explained by pre-existing differences between local authority and academy schools; 
local authority schools that are not ‘outstanding’ have further to progress. Despite the 
inconclusive evidence, it is plausible that the effect of the most recent academy 
conversions will emerge over time; many have not had the time for changes to embed.
Research by Reform and SSAT last year supports the view that it takes time for the 
benefits of academy conversion to be reflected in exam results. The research gathered 
survey responses from 654 of the then 3,362 academy schools (20 per cent) in a broadly 
representative sample. The survey found that sponsored academies are more likely to 
report improved pupil results than converter academies. In addition, more recent 
academy converters are more likely to report that results have stayed the same, and less 
likely to report that results have improved (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Have results improved since becoming an academy?
Source: Finch et al. (2014), Plan A+ 2014: The unfinished revolution
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One explanation for the slow impact on results is that so few academies are using their 
freedom and autonomy. Figure 6 shows that around a third of both converter and 
sponsored academies are using the freedoms they have over the curriculum or teachers’ 
terms and conditions. A survey of academies by the DfE reinforces these results, with a 
greater proportion of academies linking pay to performance than changing their 
curriculum.25 According to the DfE study, between half and two-thirds of academies that 
had made changes to either the curriculum or school day linked these changes to 
improved attainment.26
22  Eyles and Machin, “The Introduction of Academy Schools to England’s Education”.
23  Stephen Machin and Olma Silva, School structure, school autonomy and the tail, March 2013. 
24  Jack Worth and National Foundation for Educational Research in England and Wales, Analysis of Academy School 
Performance in GCSEs 2013: Final Report, July 2014.
25  Rob Cirin, Do Academies Make Use of Their Autonomy?, July 2014.
26  Ibid.
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Figure 6: How many schools are using or plan to use their freedoms?
Source: Finch et al. (2014), Plan A+ 2014: The unfinished revolution.
 
It is possible that academies use some freedoms over others because of the regulatory 
environment. Two of the most popular freedoms across all academies surveyed were over 
teachers’ pay and the curriculum (see Figure 6). Prior to the survey, which was undertaken 
in 2013, the Government had required all maintained schools to set out how they would 
link performance to teachers’ pay from September 2014.27 Additionally, the Government 
phased in a less prescriptive National Curriculum, which may have added to the 
legitimacy of using this freedom. Since the survey was undertaken, the Deregulation Act 
has given all school governing bodies the power to set their own term dates, independent 
from local authorities.28 
In contrast to teacher pay, only 30 per cent of converter and 38 per cent of sponsored 
academies surveyed use their freedom to change staff terms and conditions. In 2013 the 
School Teachers’ Review Body rejected proposals to remove the national framework 
around working hours and the provision to ‘rarely cover’ lessons for absent colleagues. 
This may explain why a considerably lower proportion of academies reported making 
changes to teachers’ terms and conditions in contrast to teachers’ pay. Maintaining these 
restrictions for local authority schools may deter academies from negotiating teachers’ 
terms and conditions.
To encourage innovation in all schools, the Government should go further in deregulating 
the school environment. The Government should extend academy freedoms to all 
schools. This should include the freedom to hire unqualified teachers and make changes 
to teachers’ terms and conditions. Local authorities could continue to manage and 
support local authority schools within this more autonomous framework. 
3.2 The potential of school groups
One way to drive innovation is through economies of scale. Since 2010, the number of 
academies has risen vastly. Yet within this group, the majority of schools have either been 
standalone or in multi-academy trusts of just five schools or less. Figure 7 shows that 
84 per cent of academies are either standalone schools or belong to a group of ten or 
fewer schools. Only 7 per cent are in a group of over 30 schools.
27  Department for Education, “Teachers’ Pay: Changes since September 2013,” 16 August 2013.
28  HM Government, Deregulation Act 2015, 2015.
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Figure 7: Rise of academy schools by size of academy trust
Source: Department for Education (2015): Edubase, March 2015.
20142012201020082004
N
um
b
er
 o
f o
p
en
 a
ca
d
em
y 
sc
ho
ol
s
31+ school 
MAT
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
2006
Singletons
2-5 school MAT
6-10 school MAT
11-30 school MAT
31+ school MAT 4,714
4,373
3,975
3,536
2,192
The lack of sizeable school groups may prevent academies from making the most of their 
freedoms and resources. Research published by Reform and authored by Parthenon-EY 
shows that school groups can make savings of between 5 and 8 per cent in a school’s 
total budget, allowing schools to reinvest this money to develop best practice teaching 
and management.29 In addition to their economies of scale, school groups offer a 
mechanism in which to standardise best teaching practice. Through means of a wider 
pool in which to trial new evidence-based practices, groups can offer more attractive 
career and development opportunities for teachers.
There have nevertheless been a very small number of high profile cases of large academy 
groups facing governance and financial problems. One explanation is that some chains 
grew too fast and did not sufficiently invest in their governance structures and operating 
models. These problems could be avoided were chains expected to reinvest more of their 
revenue to develop internal accountability mechanisms. While these examples are of real 
concern, they should not obscure the contribution that well-governed chains can make. 
29  Matthew Robb and Anna Grotberg, Education in Chains, March 2015.
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In addition to the problems noted above, there are a number of reasons why many 
schools and academies may not see the benefits of joining a large school group. For 
example, Ofsted inspects individual schools, irrespective of whether they are standalone 
schools or part of a high performing academy chain. Moreover, while academy groups of 
five schools or more receive capital for school rebuilding and refurbishment, this does not 
include capital for meeting the ‘basic need’ for new school places, where schools 
currently compete head to head.30 Given the importance of scale to drive innovation, 
these barriers could be preventing important gains and improvements in value for money. 
The Government should remove the barriers to schools joining school groups, with a view 
to encouraging more schools to innovate.
Recommendation
The Government should extend academy freedoms to all schools. This should include 
the freedom to hire unqualified teachers and make changes to teachers’ terms and 
conditions. It should also remove the barriers to schools joining school groups, with a 
view to encouraging more schools to innovate.
3.3 Professional autonomy
In the first education White Paper of last Parliament, The Importance of Teaching, the 
Coalition Government rightly recognised that “[n]o education system can be better than 
the quality of its teachers”.31 This renewed focus on the quality of teaching was matched 
by an expansion of Teach First and school-led initial teacher training, through the creation 
of new teaching schools, which were also aimed at addressing problems with teacher 
recruitment and retention. As Reform has argued previously, teacher quality “is the single 
biggest influence on pupils’ educational progress”.32 The recruitment and retention of high 
quality teachers are fundamental to this, as is high quality continuing professional 
development.
A recognition of the importance of teaching was matched by rhetoric that teachers know 
best.33 In the same White Paper, the Coalition Government set out its view that “teachers 
must be free to use their professionalism and expertise to support all children to 
progress”.34 To this aim, it brought in a new, knowledge-based National Curriculum and 
removed the requirement that teachers assess pupils’ progress through its level 
descriptors. 
The removal of ‘levels’ for assessing pupils’ achievement and progress should be 
welcomed. Levels had gained a reputation among school teachers and leaders as being 
both overly bureaucratic and unhelpful in assessing pupils’ progress. While it is only a year 
since they were abolished, the removal of levels has not unleashed the levels of innovation 
it was intended to. Many schools are inhibited from creating their own methods for 
assessing how well pupils are doing. This is particularly true of primary schools, where 
early formative assessment is crucial for pupils’ progress. Primary schools are typically 
much smaller than secondary schools and thus can lack the economies of scale to buy in 
additional expertise or invest in high quality teacher development. There are also concerns 
about the way in which Ofsted will judge the comparability and robustness of schools’ 
own assessment techniques.
The Government must think carefully about how it enables innovation in assessment to 
grow. During the last Parliament, the Coalition Government created an Assessment 
Innovation Fund to support schools in developing their own methods. The eight schools 
that were selected published a range of materials that are now free for other schools to 
30  Department for Education, Capital Funding for Multi-Academy Trusts (MATs), February 2015.
31  Department for Education, The Importance of Teaching: the Schools White Paper 2010, November 2010.
32  Dale Bassett, Andrew Haldenby, Will Tanner and Kimberley Trewhitt, Every teacher matters, Reform, November 2010.
33  This was one of the key findings of McKinsey’s 2007 report, Michael Barber and Mona Mourshed, How the World’s Best 
Performing School Systems Came out on Top, September 2007.  
34  Department for Education, The Importance of Teaching.
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use. The Government also established a Commission on Assessment to identify and 
share best practice with schools. Yet it is not clear how the success of this latest initiative 
will be judged, or whether it will introduce more prescription into the system. To be 
successful, the Commission must maintain professional autonomy at a school level. 
4. Better accountability 
The way in which the Government holds schools to account has a significant impact on 
the quality of education pupils receive. It can change how much attention certain groups 
of pupils get given and the qualifications they take. These are both crucial in determining a 
pupils’ chance of accessing and progressing in employment, and their potential to lead a 
full and happy life. A good accountability system will encourage schools to raise 
achievement for all their pupils, particularly for those least advantaged. 
The Coalition Government made significant improvements to school accountability by 
reforming the way school performance is measured in league tables. New minimum 
standards for primary and secondary schools have encouraged schools to focus on 
raising the achievement of all their pupils. The removal of arbitrary league table 
equivalences has encouraged more pupils to take highly valued qualifications. New 
measures of progress have enabled the Government to compare schools on their ability 
to add educational value to each pupil. Yet despite these critical improvements, a number 
of concerns still remain around the effectiveness of oversight and intervention for both 
academies and local authority schools.35   
4.1 Raising achievement for all
The Coalition Government’s reforms to the school accountability system have made huge 
progress in removing the perverse incentives for schools to focus their resources on 
pupils at key grade boundaries. A new measure of pupils’ progress in eight subjects 
(Progress 8) will be used to set minimum standards for secondary schools from 
September 2016.36,37 Poor performance on this measure will be used to highlight 
struggling schools, replacing the percentage of pupils achieving 5+ A*-C GCSE grades. 
This should encourage schools to raise achievement for all their pupils, rather than focus 
on pupils at the C/D GCSE grade boundary. 
The Coalition Government also made changes to the minimum standards for primary 
schools. While it maintained both attainment and progress measures, the percentage of 
pupils it required to meet these measures rose from 60 to 65 per cent in 2013-14 and will 
be 85 per cent from 2015-16.38 It has also raised the level at which pupils are expected to 
have reached by the end of primary school. From 2015-16, this standard will be equivalent 
to a current ‘level 4b’.39 These reforms were coupled with the introduction of an optional 
baseline assessment for pupils in reception and phonics screening at age six.40
4.2 Widening access to highly valued qualifications
Performance measures not only impact on how teachers spend their time, but the type of 
subjects that pupils study. Other important reforms to school accountability have removed 
perverse incentives to encourage pupils to study for qualifications which do not help them 
progress into further education or employment.41 The former Qualifications and 
Curriculum Development Agency (QCDA), and previous to that the Qualifications and 
35  See Amyas Morse, Investigation into the Education Funding Agency’s Oversight of Related Party Transactions at Durand 
Academy: Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, November 2014; House of Commons Education Select 
Committee, Academies and Free Schools.
36  Simon Burgess and David Thomson, Key Stage 4 Accountability: Progress Measure and Intervention Trigger, December 
2013; Department for Education, Factsheet: Progress 8 measure, February 2014. 
37  Some secondary schools opted into using this measure from September 2015. Floor standards for schools will continue 
to be based on both progress and raw attainment in reading and maths. See Department for Education, Reforming 
assessment and accountability for primary schools, March 2014. 
38  Department for Education, Reforming Assessment and Accountability for Primary Schools.
39  Ibid.
40  Ibid.
41  Alison Wolf, Review of Vocational Education: The Wolf Report, March 2011.
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Curriculum Authority, was designed to give all vocational qualifications a common scale 
‘equivalence’, irrespective of their difficulty ‘level’. This led to wide-spread ‘gaming’ in 
schools, with many pupils encouraged to study for qualifications that made them worse 
off in the labour market than had they studied for alternative qualifications.42 
The abolition of the QCDA under the Coalition Government was coupled with a 
requirement that pupils study English and maths beyond the age of 16, if they had not 
already achieved a ‘good’ pass at GCSE (grade C or above). This was supplemented with 
a new performance measure in league tables for just English and maths, and the 
introduction of the EBacc performance measure, including performance in English, 
maths, science, humanities and modern languages. Pupils on free school meals, and 
often among the most disadvantaged in society, are more likely to attain below grade C in 
GCSE English and maths than those from more advantaged backgrounds. English and 
maths have high value in the labour market.43 Thus the focus on improving access to 
these qualifications will improve the chances of those most disadvantaged being in 
employment, thereby improving wellbeing.
4.3 Narrowing the achievement gap
Narrowing the achievement gap between the least advantaged in society and everyone 
else was a core focus for the Coalition Government. It introduced a Pupil Premium 
through which to allocate schools additional funds for each pupil on free school meals. 
Schools are required to publish spending on the Pupil Premium on their websites. In this 
financial year, the Pupil Premium is worth £1,300 per primary school pupil and £935 per 
secondary school pupil. The rationale was to encourage schools to admit more pupils 
from disadvantaged backgrounds,44 and to provide those schools with more funds on the 
basis that providing education to these pupils is more expensive. It should be noted that 
weighting funding according to deprivation was also the basis for changes to school 
funding through local authorities, which is discussed more in the next section.
While the gap between pupils on free school meals and everyone else has remained 
stubbornly wide at between 25 and 26 per cent on the headline 5+ GCSEs A*-C 
measure,45 there are signs that it is narrowing on the new progress measure.46 According 
to the new education research centre, Education Datalab, on this measure the gap is on 
track to close by 2032.47
5. Fairer funding
5.1 Schools funding
In addition to rising public spending on education, spending per school pupil aged 5-16 
years has also been rising in real terms at least a decade.48,49 It grew at an historic rate 
between 1998 and 2009, increasing by an average of nearly 6 per cent a year.50 Since 
2010, growth has been much slower, averaging 0.7 per cent a year.51 The schools budget 
now stands at £39 billion and remains the third largest ringfence in public spending, after 
the NHS and defence. 
The reason most often cited for increasing per pupil funding is to improve pupils’ 
outcomes. Yet two separate studies for the DfE have questioned a relationship between 
42  Lorraine Dearden, Leslie McGranahan and Barbara Sianesi, An in-Depth Analysis of the Returns to National Vocational 
Qualifications Obtained at Level 2, December 2004.
43  See Appendix 3 in Wolf, Review of Vocational Education for an overview of the literature.
44  While all state-funded schools are required to follow the Schools Admissions Code, there is a considerable body of 
evidence to show how schools can “cherry pick” high attaining pupils.
45  Department for Education, Revised GCSE and Equivalents Results in England, 2013 to 2014.
46  Education Datalab, Seven Thing You Might Not Know about Our Schools, March 2015.
47  Ibid.
48  Haroon Chowdry and Luke Sibieta, Trends in education and spending in schools, Institute for Fiscal Studies, October 
2011, Figure 2.
49  This excludes funding for pupils aged 16-19, which has fallen over the last Parliament.
50  Ibid.
51  Ibid.
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school spending and the quality of education. 52 The Coalition Government chose to 
ignore this in maintaining a ringfence around the schools budget for 5-16 year olds.
Previous Reform research has also shown there to be no relationship between spending 
and pupil outcomes at a school level. Figure 8 demonstrates the absence of a correlation 
between per pupil funding and results in English and maths at the end of primary and 
secondary school. The contextual value added score measures whether pupils within the 
school are making more or less than average progress when compared with pupils from 
similar backgrounds.53 The compensated funding level is calculated on the basis of a 
hypothetical national funding formula, accounting for factors currently used to fund 
schools in England, such a deprivation and schools’ fixed costs. The dispersion of dots 
shows the wide variation of funding and results, and the bunching in the centre shows 
that there is no relationship between the two.
Figure 8: Correlation between per pupil funding and results
Source: Thorpe et al. (2013), Must do better: spending on schools; 
Reform calculations based on Department for Education (2011), Income and 
expenditure in schools in England: Local Authority maintained schools, 2010-11.
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This analysis suggests that greater funding alone will not improve pupils’ results. Schools 
vary substantially in efficiency; some achieve exceptional results with relatively low per 
pupil funding. This varying efficiency may well explain why the education sector as a 
whole is struggling to improve value for money. On a fair comparison of per pupil funding, 
some schools spend twice as much as others to achieve the same results for their pupils. 
The Government must therefore improve schools’ relative efficiency in order to improve 
education spending within existing and planned budgets. 
The current accountability framework for schools is not geared up to encourage schools 
to provide value for money within their existing budgets. While the Education Funding 
Agency conducts annual financial audits for academy schools, it is not expected to 
assess the ability of the academy to translate these funds into outcomes for pupils.54 In 
addition, the Ofsted inspection framework does not make a ‘judgement’ on school 
52  See Deloitte, Quality Counts: What Can Analysis of the National Pupil Database Tell Us about Educational Outcomes?, 
November 2012; Rebecca Allen, Imran Rasul and Leigh McKenna, Understanding School Financial Decisions, 2012.
53  The contextual value added measure did not include pupils’ prior attainment.
54  National Audit Office, Performance and Capability of the Education Funding Agency, January 2014.
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efficiency.55 Nevertheless, within the context of making a judgement on the quality of 
leadership and management, an inspector is expected to “...evaluate how efficiently and 
effectively the school is led and managed.”56 Although there are questions around 
Ofsted’s current ability to undertake the task, this is a missed opportunity to realign 
schools’ priorities to provide value for money. 
The above analysis is muddied by an arbitrary and unfair school funding system. Soon 
after the Coalition Government came to power, it consulted on the introduction of a fair 
funding formula for schools (teaching 5 to 16 year olds), recognising that “the school 
funding system creates large variations…that bear little resemblance to the needs of 
schools and their pupils today.” 57,58 It took small steps towards this aim by reducing the 
number of factors local authorities use when allocating funding to schools and 
streamlining central funding through three separate blocks.59
However, there are still vast funding disparities across schools in different local authorities, 
when accounting for similar pupil intakes. Previous research by Reform shows that the 
amount of per pupil funding schools receive can range from between £2,000 and 
£8,000.60 While additional funding through the Pupil Premium has also reallocated more 
funding to schools in the most deprived areas, this has not achieved a consistent or fair 
funding system on a pupil level.61
The lack of a consistent funding formula for schools prevents the Government from 
comparing the relative efficiency of schools. While there has been much recent rhetoric 
about ‘coasting’ schools, some schools may flatline in the league tables with a relatively 
low budget, and others with a relatively high budget. A consistent funding formula across 
schools would make it easier to compare value for money across schools.
Recommendation 
The Government should introduce a national funding formula that is fair and consistent 
across schools with similar pupil intakes weighted for pupils’ deprivation and local labour 
market conditions.
5.2 Funding across government
Maintaining the ringfence on the schools budget has meant that other areas of public 
spending, and indeed other areas of spending within the education budget as a whole, 
have had to bear significant cuts in comparison. For example, school and college 
education for those aged 16 to 19 years have not been protected by the ringfence.
Table 1 shows the distribution of spending across the education budget. It shows a 
significant increase in spending on Early Years (39 per cent) and schools (3 per cent) in 
comparison to a large reduction in spending on 16-19 year olds (14 per cent decrease).62 
Significant reductions have also been made to the adult skills budget, which sits within 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). According to the Government’s 
own figures, this budget decreased by 11 per cent in real terms in 2014-15 and is set to 
reduce by a further 24 per cent this financial year.63
55  The previous inspection regime (2005-2012) had a single judgement for efficiency in a school. Inspectors were required 
to give a level rating specifically for value for money, which could include consideration of “...how efficiently the provider 
uses its staff, financial planning, and controls and mechanisms to ensure accountability and financial stability.”
56  Ofsted, School Inspection Handbook, January 2015.
57  Department for Education, Consultation on School Funding Reform: Proposals for a Fairer System, 2011. 
58  Department for Education, “Fair Funding for All Schools,” 13 April 2012.
59  Department for Education, Calculating Schools Block Units of Funding 2015 to 2016, July 2014.
60  Thorpe, Trewhitt and Zuccollo, Must Do Better: Spending on Schools.
61  Sibieta, “Schools Spending.”
62  Most of this increase is attributable to the expansion of early years education entitlement to two year olds (Sibieta, 
“Schools Spending”). 
63  Skills Funding Agency, “Allocations for the Funding Year 2015 to 2016,” 26 February 2015.
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Table 1: Department for Education DEL budget, 2010-11 and 2014-15
Source: Luke Sibieta (2015), “Schools spending”, IFS Briefing Note.
 2010-11 2014-15 % total change % annual average
 (£bn, 2015-16 prices) (real terms)  
DfE capital DEL 7.8 5.1 -34.3% -10.0%
DfE resource DEL 54.8 54.2 -1.2% -0.3%
Of which:    
Early years budget 2.1 2.9 39.1% 8.6%
Schools budget (ages 
5-16) 37.5 38.6 3.0% 0.7%
16-19 education budget 8.8 7.6 -13.6% -3.6%
DfE total DEL 62.6 59.3 -5.3% 1.4%
Given the importance of further education in improving a person’s job prospects, 
continuing to reduce the adult skills and 16-19 education budget is likely to reduce 
wellbeing.64 School and college education deliver important qualifications that are vital for 
a young person’s employment opportunities, and the adult skills budget funds education 
and training for adults without formal qualifications or the unemployed. These groups of 
people are often furthest away from the labour market and thus, among the most 
disadvantaged in society. 
While there is room to achieve better value for money within the schools budget, 
opportunities to shift spending to towards those with low, or no, qualifications must be 
prioritised. The Government should consider the broader impact of education spending 
decisions on improving employment opportunities for the most disadvantaged. 
BIS uses employment data in order to estimate the labour market returns to qualifications 
gained in further education.65 Over the last Parliament, DfE developed destination data for 
school leavers.66 This shows the percentage of pupils leaving for certain types of tertiary 
education or employment. However, these two datasets are not integrated, and are based 
on aggregate rather than person-level data. This prevents an evaluation of the relative 
value of different forms of education in improving employment. In particular, current school 
destination data does not enable a comparison of the employment prospects for pupils 
achieving a certain level or grade. Students do not therefore have a full enough picture of 
which qualifications and forms of education will support them into employment or further 
education.
Recommendation
The Government should consider the broader impact of education spending decisions 
on improving employment opportunities for the most disadvantaged. It should integrate 
school destination data with employment data, including earnings and out-of-work 
benefits.
64  See for example Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, The Relationship between Adult Learning and 
Wellbeing: Evidence from the 1958 National Child Development Study, November 2012; Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills, The Impact of Further Education Learning, January 2013.
65  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Estimation of the Labour Market Returns to Qualifications Gained in 
English Further Education, December 2014.
66  Department for Education, Destinations of Key Stage 4 and Key Stage 5 Students, 2012/13, January 2014.
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6. Conclusion
The greatest challenge for the Government’s education policy is to improve value for 
money in schools. This requires a relentless focus on improving the quality of teaching, 
and the right structures and funding systems to ensure these improvements are cost-
effective and sustainable. While the Coalition Government made important improvements 
to school and professional autonomy and accountability, more is needed to encourage 
schools to use their autonomy to innovate. The introduction of a consistent and fair 
funding formula would reallocate resource to the most needy and allow a better 
comparison of schools’ relative value for money.
